

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

A STRONG NATO IS ESSENTIAL TO THE
UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

by

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ABSTRACT

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As the United States fights the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) wrestles with its post cold-war role, it is imperative that America stays deeply engaged in Europe. The United States must maintain relevance in Europe to continue cooperation with Europeans on security and economic policies. The United States has maintained its most influential position on the Continent through its ongoing NATO leadership. However, on 16 August 2004, President Bush announced significant troop reductions in both Europe and Asia as part of the major restructuring and restationing of U.S. forces. On the surface this does not conflict with the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 2002, but as an overall U.S. position it may further divide the United States from its European allies, undermining NSS goals. The United States and Europe have always had a different view of the world. This view was muted during the Cold War when they were united against the USSR, but today with no common enemy the differences have come to the forefront. This divide can only deepen as the United States disengages from Europe. As their strategic visions diverge and the United States reduces its presence to just a few thousand forces spread among a handful of European countries, its influence may fade to the point where the United States is no longer a factor in European policymaking. Though not an immediate concern, it could easily become one over the next two decades as the United States concentrates on the GWOT and the European Union (EU) concentrates on strengthening its union politically, economically as well as militarily with ratification of its first constitution. A strong NATO will aid the United States in the GWOT, be the international force used to prevent regional conflicts within Europe's influence and ensure the continued strong economic growth of Europe.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	iii
A STRONG NATO IS ESSENTIAL TO THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY	1
NEW US FORCE STRUCTURE IN EUROPE	2
STRENGTHEN ALLIANCES TO DEFEAT GLOBAL TERRORISM	3
WORK WITH OTHERS TO DIFFUSE REGIONAL CONFLICTS	4
A NEW ERA OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH	7
OPTIONS	9
CONCLUSION	10
RECOMMENDATIONS.....	11
ENDNOTES	13
BIBLIOGRAPHY	17

A STRONG NATO IS ESSENTIAL TO THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

As the United States fights the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) wrestles with its post cold-war role, it is imperative that America stays deeply engaged in Europe. The United States must maintain relevance in Europe to continue cooperation with Europeans on security and economic policies. Areas where the United States has maintained its most influential positions on the Continent have been through its ongoing NATO leadership as well as through military presence, engagement and commerce. However, without the presence so go the leadership positions.

On 16 August 2004, President Bush announced significant troop reductions in both Europe and Northeast Asia as part of the major restructuring and restationing of U.S. forces.¹ Though this was no surprise since the Secretary of Defense announced his intention to do this during the early stages of the Bush administration, it is now official. On the surface this does not conflict with the U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 2002, but as an overall U.S. position it may further divide the United States from its European allies, undermining several NSS goals.

The United States and Europe have always had a different view of the world, mainly from very different historical backgrounds. This view was muted during the Cold War when they were united against the USSR, but today with no common enemy the differences have come to the forefront. This divide can only deepen as the United States disengages from Europe. As their strategic visions diverge and the United States reduces its presence to just a few thousand forces spread among a handful of European countries, its influence may fade to the point where the United States is no longer a factor in European policymaking. Though not an immediate threat, it could easily become one over the next two decades as the United States concentrates on the GWOT and the European Union (EU) concentrates on strengthening its union politically, economically as well as militarily with the ratification of its first constitution.

This scenario could easily undermine many of the U.S. NSS goals. Three of the eight goals are listed below.

- Strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends²
- Work with others to defuse regional conflicts³
- Ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade⁴

Europe has been one of America's strongest supporters in its efforts to defeat global terrorism. Without this close relationship, U.S. power to defeat this threat is greatly diminished. In addition, Europe has also stood with the United States to diffuse regional conflicts. The

United States must continue to strengthen its resolve with leadership and partnership to diffuse regional conflicts across Europe, Eurasia and Northern Africa. Finally, the EU is potentially becoming one of the strongest economic powers in the world and America is more intertwined with its economy than any other country or region. This makes European security an imperative to the economic well-being of the United States.

NEW US FORCE STRUCTURE IN EUROPE

One can easily argue that four mechanized/armor brigades in Europe are not justified by the current threats in Europe; however, what type of forces and how many should remain is open to great debate. President Bush's announcement to bring home 60,000 to 70,000 uniformed personnel and approximately 100,000 family members and civilian employees came as no surprise as DOD continues to transform while fighting the GWOT.⁵ The United States Army Europe (USAREUR) will bear the brunt of this with approximately 40,000 U.S. Army soldiers returning from Europe and over 160 installations closing across Europe over the next ten years.⁶ Though collective defense has evolved into collective security, NATO's role is still vital to U.S. national interests not only in Europe but around the world.

Many critics question whether fixed alliances with traditional partners are helpful in dealing with the GWOT,⁷ but U.S. military presence in Europe is more than just helping Europe defend itself; it is about presence, leadership and influence. "NATO has long been something more than the sum of its parts. Designed in part to transcend old-fashioned balance-of-power politics within Europe, it has evolved over the years into a deep-rooted institution with a commitment to democratic values and practices that, along with its unique, integrated military structure, sustains it even at times when its members' short-term strategic calculations diverge. In the wake of the bitter dispute over the war in Iraq, however, it is unclear whether the transatlantic partners are ready and willing to overcome their differences and reaffirm their basic common interests in security and other relations: the essence of the NATO alliance".⁸

With over one quarter of the U.S. Army active forces deployed in direct support of the GWOT, another quarter preparing to deploy and another quarter recovering from deployment, there are not enough soldiers left to support all the other missions the U.S. Army is given. On top of this the Army is also transforming every tactical organization across its entire spectrum. This has caused the Army to reevaluate every mission not in direct support of the GWOT to determine the best way to allocate its limited resources. The United States will remain committed to the provisions of the Alliance treaty, but the end of the Soviet threat no longer requires an American troop presence for collective defense.

STRENGTHEN ALLIANCES TO DEFEAT GLOBAL TERRORISM

A major goal of the Bush NSS is to “strengthen alliances to defeat global terrorism and work to prevent attacks against us and our friends.”⁹ The United States has already seen a great divide between it and a few European Alliance partners on the strategy for fighting global terrorism. Though the NATO Secretary General implemented Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty immediately following the 11 September 2001 attacks on the United States and took significant measures to assist the United States, lack of consensus in NATO diminished its support to Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and only 16 of 26 NATO countries are deployed with the U.S. action there. Though the United States prefers building coalitions rather than acting through NATO, NATO backing is still critical. Pulling back from Europe at this time, though not tied to current tensions with Germany and France, can only weaken one of the greatest alliances against global terrorism. NATO is the strongest U.S. long term alliance. It has one of the best established military command and control structures and an established intelligence sharing system which is vital to tracking terrorists that transit through Europe and neighboring countries. Europeans also have 30 years of experience in dealing with modern terrorism. The restationing of 40,000 soldiers from USAREUR back to the United States may be sending the wrong message about the U.S. commitment to Europe and the NATO Alliance. The Germans, who will see almost all of these reductions, understand the United States’ rationale for a restructuring and restationing in light of their commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the threat reduction to Europe, but they may not understand the significant levels of these reductions.¹⁰ The bottom line is they support the withdrawal but lament the economic consequences.

As part of the United States restructuring and restationing plan there are proposals to establish some bases in Eastern Europe and rotate forces to them from the United States. This seems like a great plan for expeditionary engagement, but the United States will not have the units to rotate into Europe with its commitments in Iraq and Afghanistan. This rotation plan would, of course, have to be put on hold indefinitely due to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and so Europe will simply be left with whatever forces are permanently stationed there.

The United States has traditionally held influence in European affairs because of its leadership in NATO as Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) and possessing the most powerful military force supporting NATO. However, if the United States reduces forces too far in Europe it could lead to a loss of influence in Europe and even a call demanding that the SACEUR be a European.¹¹ Additionally if the United States withdrew from the integrated command structure then all influence would be lost. To further compound this, as the European

Union (EU) gains strength, U.S. leadership within NATO may be the only way for the United States to hold any sway within European leadership. The ultimate failure here would be for NATO to dissolve and leave the EU wholly responsible for European security objectives with no U.S. connection. This would have deleterious implications for the alliance against the GWOT.

NATO also brings a certain amount of legitimacy to any operation around the world. NATO sanctioned operations are looked at in more legitimate terms than U.S. unilateral operations. Because hegemonic United States is often viewed as the big bully, NATO gives it a different face and significant international recognition. Even though the United States is often the lead contributor of forces, NATO sanction provides significantly more international legitimacy and cooperation. This helps somewhat to excise the unilateral moniker from the United States.

WORK WITH OTHERS TO DIFFUSE REGIONAL CONFLICTS

Another goal of the Bush NSS is to work with others to diffuse regional conflicts.¹² Currently NATO and the EU are not capable of diffusing regional conflicts militarily without U.S. leadership and resources. The United States has been the leader within NATO since its inception in 1949. It appears that without the U.S. leadership and resources NATO could simply fade away or become irrelevant.¹³ The United States and the United Kingdom (UK) have traditionally been the only nations willing and/or capable of deploying and leading NATO missions. Though NATO and the EU are working toward sharing more of the security burden, both troop and monetary, they are a long way from a force viable of conducting expeditionary operations and quelling any regional conflicts within Europe, Eurasia or North Africa. The European Security Strategy states that the EU and the United States acting together are “a formidable force for good in the world” and this is reason for the EU to build up its capabilities further and increase its coherence.¹⁴ However, Article III-309 of the EU Constitution only gives the following missions to any EU defense and security forces: joint disarmament operations, humanitarian and rescue tasks, military advice and assistance tasks, conflict prevention and peace-keeping tasks, tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making and post-conflict stabilization.¹⁵

Additionally, NATO countries are spending far too little on defense with most spending less than two percent of their GDPs for defense. Only France at 2.6 percent and the United Kingdom at 2.4 percent are anywhere close to the 3.3 percent the United States spends on defense.¹⁶ The EU draft Constitution directs the EU to “proceed more intensively to develop its defense capacities through the development of its national contributions and participation, where appropriate, in multinational forces,” and “have the capacity to supply by 2007 at the

latest, either at national level or as a component of multinational force groups, targeted combat units for the missions planned, structured at a tactical level as a battle group, with support elements including transport and logistics, capable of carrying out the tasks referred to in Article III-309.”¹⁷ Though these provisions are spelled out in the new EU Constitution, it is unlikely that most member states will have the national will to meet this standard. Many EU countries have continued to exceed the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) mandated maximum three percent deficit ceiling with no penalties, so there is no reason to believe they will comply with this mandate when the constitution is ratified. Many current European governments understand they do not have the means to compete with many countries militarily so they are very content to rely on Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty for their security blanket. The European Security Strategy further adds to this as it states, “As a union of 25 members, spending more than 160 billion Euros on defense, we should be able to sustain several operations simultaneously.”¹⁸

The Balkans conflicts give proof of Europe’s poor record of conflict resolution without NATO/U.S. commitment.

The Balkan conflict at the beginning of the decade revealed European military incapacity and political disarray; the Kosovo conflict at decade’s end exposed a transatlantic gap in military technology and the ability to wage modern warfare that would only widen in subsequent years. Outside of Europe, the disparity by the close of the 1990s was even more starkly apparent as it became clear that the ability of European powers, individually or collectively, to project decisive force into regions of conflict beyond the continent was negligible. Europeans could provide peacekeeping forces in the Balkans — indeed; they could and eventually did provide the vast bulk of those forces in Bosnia and Kosovo. But they lacked the wherewithal to introduce and sustain a fighting force in potentially hostile territory, even in Europe. Under the best of circumstances, the European role was limited to filling out peacekeeping forces after the United States had, largely on its own, carried out the decisive phases of a military mission and stabilized the situation. As some Europeans put it, the real division of labor consisted of the United States “making the dinner” and the Europeans “doing the dishes.”¹⁹

Without some U.S. leadership in European defense forces, regional conflicts could easily go unchecked and bring new instability to Europe and Eurasia. If NATO were to dissolve, the EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) could become Europe’s sole defense force with little or no United States involvement. This could become a reality in the future as the EU member states move to ratify a constitution that can be viewed to be at odds with the NATO treaty. The new constitution could force EU members of NATO to serve two alliances with diverging views.²⁰ Article I-16, the common foreign and security policy of the EU draft Constitution states that:

- The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defense policy that might lead to a common defense.
- Member States shall actively and unreservedly support the Union's common foreign and security policy in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union's action in this area. They shall refrain from action contrary to the Union's interests or likely to impair its effectiveness.²¹

Article I-40 (2) of the EU constitution further defines this.

- The European Council shall identify the union's strategic interests and determine the objectives of its common foreign and security policy. The Council shall frame this policy within the framework of the strategic guidelines established by the European Council and in accordance with Part III.²²

But then as if to deconflict EU security policies with the North Atlantic Treaty, Article 1-41 states that:

- The policy of the Union in accordance with this Article shall not prejudice the specific character of the security and defense policy of certain Member States, it shall respect the obligations of certain Member States, which see their common defense realized in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, under the North Atlantic Treaty, and be compatible with the common security and defense policy established within that framework.²³

Conflicts will surely arise as some EU members are not members of NATO and some NATO members, the United States being one of them, are not EU members. As conflicts arise many of the EU countries could chose to opt out of NATO. Though there have been many missteps trying to establish EU defense cooperation in the past, the EU took a first big step in exercising independent military command by assuming the NATO SFOR mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina on 2 December 2004. As proof of the dual mission of the NATO and EU forces, about 80 percent of the soldiers on the SFOR mission simply switched their NATO patches for EU Force (EUFOR) patches. The EU's Foreign Policy Minister, Javier Solana said, "Today the European Union assumes a new responsibility which will be carried out in the same spirit and with the same efficiency as its predecessors from NATO. All this is part of a journey to the only possible destination, the European institutions."²⁴

Many would argue this transition away from NATO and to an EU Force is good for the United States. It would relieve the United States of large NATO expenses and relieve the

United States of many military commitments to European security. The EU RRF could compel EU countries to start increasing burden sharing for their national security. However, based on their past dismal record of conflict resolution and weak government will, the United States could be forced to respond to any major crisis affecting the EU security. No matter how much the United States wants the NATO member countries to step up and take care of their own security issues, other domestic issues take priority. The other reality is that European security and stability is an important U.S. interest, forcing U.S. involvement when the Europeans fail. This could cost more in the long term and do nothing to diffuse regional conflicts.

A NEW ERA OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC GROWTH

Another major goal of the Bush NSS is to ignite a new era of global economic growth through free markets and free trade.²⁵ Arguably this is not something new for Europe but aimed more at the new and growing markets of Asia and Eastern European countries. It does however specifically state, "A return to strong economic growth in Europe and Japan is vital to U.S. national security interests. We want our allies to have strong economies for their own sake, for the sake of the global economy, and for the sake of global security."²⁶ Recent history shows that free market economies promote prosperity and reduce poverty which in turn promotes security and stability.

Joseph P. Quinlin, senior fellow at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Relations, points out it is more than free trade that promotes economic growth but foreign direct investment (FDI). "Trade statistics remain the standard benchmark by which governments, politicians and the media usually measure international commerce. And yet a trade-only view of America's global economic engagement is dangerously misleading, because it overlooks a basic fact: whenever and wherever possible, U.S. firms prefer to sell goods and services abroad through their foreign affiliates rather than export them from the U.S. Foreign [direct] investment is the backbone of the transatlantic economy, not trade. Trade with Europe only accounts for about 20 percent of the transatlantic commerce. And when one adds investment and trade together to get a more complete picture, one sees that U.S. economic engagement remains overwhelmingly focused on Europe – that's where the markets are, that's where the profits are."²⁷

This scenario presents an interesting dilemma for America to spread economic growth. If American companies prefer direct investment over trade they will be reluctant to invest in countries that cannot match Europe's secure and stable environment. Certainly trade will happen but investment will be small until U.S. corporations feel comfortable with the security

and stability of the nation and its government. This is easily shown with the investment deficit between Europe and the rest of the world. American firms invested in excess of \$750 billion in capital overseas during the 1990s with roughly half going to Western Europe. American investment in the Netherlands alone was twice what it was in Mexico and ten times what it was in China. Europe, not Asia or Latin America, is the most important source of global earnings for American companies. Similarly, for many leading European firms, the United States remains the most important market in the world.²⁸ This leads to the proverbial paradox where free trade leads to security and stability but security and stability are essential beforehand to attract trade and investment. U.S. firms clearly see the Western European nations as the best FDI option at this time. These nations have very stable governments, and they enjoy the collective security of NATO. It also helps that the most powerful military in the world is part of the NATO alliance. European security is fairly certain for the immediate future. But can this security be sustained as EU membership expands to nations which are new to the global market?

There is not much doubt based on comments by many European leaders that the EU wants to compete against the United States as an economic superpower. The enlargement of the EU to 25 members in 2004 brought the EU equal with the United States in annual income. Despite this stated competition and the acknowledged growing divide between the United States and Europe, it appears their economies are too strongly intertwined to really drive a wedge between them. William Drozdiak, president of the American Council on Germany, states that, "the forces of globalization and competitive markets are driving Americans and Europeans closer together, not apart". He feels that the full potential of this economic relationship is not yet realized even with U.S. and European companies investing more in each other's economies than they do in the entire rest of the world. "Together they account for more than half the trade and investment flows in the world. Their business with each other exceeds \$2.5 trillion a year and provides jobs for some 12 million workers."²⁹

In spite of these facts some critics are skeptical of continued trade and investment growth across the Atlantic. Adam S. Posen of the Brookings Institute sees the current economic parity between the United States and the EU as fleeting. "This parity, however, is not going to last. Given differentials in demographics (both fertility and immigration rates) and in productivity growth that will persist for the foreseeable future, American economic growth will outstrip European growth. Absent some change in current trends, the U.S. economy will be nearly 20% bigger than the enlarged European economy in 2020."³⁰ Others opine that Europe has too many ancient rivalries, and "EU countries show a marked tendency to talk European but to act national. For instance, France and Britain will not countenance any talk of replacing their

national seats on the UN Security Council with a single EU seat. Germany's attempt to get its own permanent membership of the Security Council is currently opposed by Spain and Italy--in the name of Europe, naturally."³¹ There is also skepticism that the EU can continue on its present path of federalism without fracturing and adopting a less integrated approach. This could be caused by increasingly divergent political interests and views, loss of deep rooted national traditions and weakening economies of the wealthiest EU nations. Germany's economy, the largest in Europe, is showing strains from its integration of the former East Germany and its years as a welfare state.³² In addition to this, a large reduction of U.S. presence in Germany means less money invested into local economies but more importantly it means the loss of jobs for thousands of local nationals employed by the U.S. military. A less integrated EU is not bad for the U.S. as long as NATO is still the primary security force of Europe. If the EU were to fracture absent NATO, Europe could "divide into rival power blocks" and threaten its economic stability and security.³³

Despite the overflowing optimism from many European leaders and the dark predictions of their skeptics, all would agree that Europe's economy will grow and the United States will probably remain one of its largest, if not largest trade and investment partner. With this in mind, it is imperative that the United States does all it can to remain influential in Europe to help ensure continued favorable trade and investment relations. Whatever scenario emerges over the next 10-20 years it is clear that U.S. engagement in European security is vital. As the EU and NATO expand, the United States, through its NATO participation and leadership, helps bring security and stability to the European countries and maybe eventually the Mediterranean rim countries. This in turn provides the incentive for U.S. corporations to expand trade and FDI to these countries. It must be understood that because Europe and the United States are so heavily invested in each other's economy, European security and stability are imperative to the economic well-being of the United States.

OPTIONS

Though status quo may seem like the best option based on the previous analysis, it is simply not feasible or sustainable. Current world commitments and lack of any current, substantial threat to Europe simply do not justify maintaining current troop strengths. There are really only three options available to the United States at this point. The first option is to follow the plan being developed by Department of Defense and U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). This plan calls for the two U.S. Army Divisions to return to the States, stationing a Stryker Brigade in Germany, stationing an additional airborne battalion in Italy to create a full

airborne brigade and consolidating USAREUR and 5th Corps Headquarters. An appropriate level of support structure would also remain to sustain forces remaining in Europe. The plan also calls for troops to rotate from the United States to newly established Eastern European bases in the Black Sea area to conduct training with NATO nations as well as NATO Partner nations.³⁴

The second option is only a slight modification to the current plan but offers significant impacts. In addition to option one, the United States could add one additional medium brigade combat team and designate both these brigade-sized units as dedicated NATO security/engagement forces. Forces in Italy would remain world-wide deployable. These dedicated forces could then conduct training missions in Eastern Europe and continue the Partnership for Peace program while eliminating the need to rotate overworked and over-deployed forces from the States until GWOT commitments are reduced. These forces would engage with NATO member militaries as well as NATO Partner nations in the USEUCOM area of operations.

The third option is to create Integrated Multinational Divisions (IMD) within NATO similar to what Lieutenant Colonel Raymond Millen proposes in his monographs, *Tweaking NATO: The Case for Integrated Multinational Divisions*³⁵ and *Reconfiguring the American Military Presence in Europe*.³⁶ Drop the Cold War approach of separate national divisions and numerous parallel structures and integrate at the division level. Then consolidate these IMDs onto large division-sized bases.³⁷ The United States could easily form one or two IMDs from the existing division structure in Germany and contribute forces to other IMDs as needed. The division structure would look similar to the current U.S. Division structure but the units composing the division will be from various nations based on capability and location.³⁸ This option could add an additional two brigades and two division headquarters to the current Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy.

CONCLUSION

The United States must keep NATO strong and engaged in order to make the U.S. NSS viable. The primary need for NATO did not go away with the end of the Cold War. NATO was created to deal with the "German Problem," or, in other words, prevent another arms race between European nations. It still serves the same purpose today. By ensuring collective security, no member nation has to raise a large military to defend against or attack its neighbors. This brings security and stability while keeping military costs low. That in turn aids a

country's economic well-being and encourages significant foreign investment. It is this environment the United States must continue to support because it in turn supports the NSS.

Option three represents the most viable option to accomplish this. This option provides strong U.S. leadership within NATO at a reduced cost, a strong security partner in the U.S. GWOT and a guarantee of a secure and stable Europe. Restructuring of U.S. forces in Europe is required to address the current commitments of U.S. forces in Iraq and Afghanistan as well as the lack of any current security threats to Europe and Eurasia. IMDs will allow the United States and other member nations to "downsize their aggregate force contribution without reducing their commitment to the Alliance."³⁹ This offers all members better utilization of existing resources and smaller military expenditures while further integrating the United States within NATO.

The United States commitment to Europe will be measured in how many troops are permanently stationed there and not by how many rotate there from the United States for exercises. Also, based on the current force strength and commitments, the United States could not afford to rotate any forces to Europe for the foreseeable future. The United States must look at its forces in Europe as European engagement forces and not necessarily as world-wide deployers. The European partners of America are important enough for the United States to invest the stationing of permanent party forces in Europe to ensure their leadership in European security as well as their support in the continuing war on terrorism. The current DOD plan, assuming the GWOT lasts into the foreseeable future, will cause the two combat brigades planned for Europe to spend half their time outside of Europe.

This option is not without obstacles though. The largest obstacle will be the issue of sovereignty. "Under this organization, countries would surrender a degree of command authority of the contributed units to the Alliance. The United States may not relish the idea of being under the foreign commanders, even though its troops have served under foreign commanders before." However, the United States still retains the most senior position as the SACEUR. Other obstacles may include the language barriers, differing operating procedures and equipment compatibility.⁴⁰

RECOMMENDATIONS

The United States can ensure a strong and viable NATO by doing the following:

- Adopt the IMD structure and encourage other NATO members to do the same.
- Commit to lead two IMDs.
- Contribute up to four brigade-equivalent units to IMDs as necessary.

A secure and stable Europe is a vital interest of the United States. A strong NATO is currently the best vehicle for the United States to make sure of this. The maintenance of U.S. ground troops in Europe signals a continued U.S. engagement, which in turn permits the United States to remain influential in European security affairs as well as bilateral coalition building for future crises. A small but committed investment in NATO and European security today will certainly prevent a significant expenditure during a future conflict in Europe. Transatlantic strategic cooperation is one reason why the second half of the twentieth century was more stable than the first. If the United States and Europe can agree on a common strategy to meet the challenges of the new era, the world will be better for it.⁴¹ A strong NATO will aid the United States in the GWOT, be the international force used to prevent regional conflicts within Europe's influence and ensure the continued strong economic growth of Europe.

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ENDNOTES

¹ George W. Bush, "Making America More Secure by Transforming Our Military," (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 16 August 2004); available from <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/defense>>; Internet; accessed 25 September 2004.

² George W. Bush, *The National Security Strategy of the United States of America*, (Washington, D.C.: The White House, September 2002), 5-7.

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